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A CRITIQUE OF THE PROMISE MODEL OF CONTRACT
WALLACE

K.

LIGHTSEY*

Lawyers and most contract scholars assume that a contract is
simply a promise that the law will enforce.' This concept of contracts as a subset of promises, a concept referred to in this Article
as the "promise model" of contract, is implicit in most legal thinking about contracts, but receives an explicit, rigorous treatment in
a recent work by Professor Charles Fried.2 Professor Fried begins
his book by drawing upon basic liberal notions of respect for individual autonomy to develop the principle that a promise is morally
binding on the promisor. From this principle he fashions the central thesis of his book: "[S]ince a contract is first of all a promise,
the contract must be kept because a promise must be kept."3 The
remainder of the book uses this thesis to explain and criticize contract doctrine.
In a book published the same year as Professor Fried's work,
Professor P.S. Atiyah also compares promise philosophy and contract doctrine.4 Like Fried, Atiyah predicates his analysis upon the
promise model of contract. Professor Atiyah, however, proceeds
from this predicate to develop a methodology and to reach conclusions diametrically opposed to those of Professor Fried. Often referring to legal doctrine and to the principles and values underlying that doctrine, Professor Atiyah criticizes the principal
philosophical accounts of promising and decides that promises, per
se, do not create moral obligations. 5 He then develops his theory
* Law clerk to Judge John Minor Wisdom, United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit, 1983-1984 term; law clerk to Chief Justice Warren E. Burger, United States Supreme Court, 1984 Term. A.B., 1979 Duke University; J.D., 1983 Harvard University.
1. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRAC'rS § 1 (1979) [hereinafter cited as RESTATEMENT]; C. FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE 17 (1981); F. POLLOCK, PRINCIPLES OF CONTRACT 1 (12th ed. 1946); 1 S. WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 1 (W.
Jaeger 3d ed. 1957).
2. See C. FRIED, supra note 1.
3. Id. at 17.
4. See P. ATiVAH, PROMISES, MORALS, AND LAW (1981).
5. See id. at 123-29.
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that a promise is an admission of a preexisting obligation on the
part of the promisor. This obligation results from either the harm
to the promisee or the unjust enrichment of the promisor that
would occur if the promise is not kept." Thus, he concludes, if
there has been no reliance by the promisee and no conferral of
benefit upon the promisor, there is no immorality in the promisor's
7
revocation of his promise.
Although Professors Fried and Atiyah reach opposite conclusions, both scholars derive their theories from discrepancies between contract doctrine and the promise principle (the principle
that promises are morally binding). These discrepancies fall into
two related general categories. The first category concerns the legal
doctrine of consideration. Because of this doctrine, contract law
traditionally has not considered a mere promise to be a sufficient
basis for contractual obligation; instead, the promise must have
been given in exchange for a valid consideration. This is true even
in the bilateral executory contract, in which one promise is exchanged for another promise. In a wholly executory contract,
neither reliance nor conferral of benefit has occurred. Thus the
promise principle seems to be the sole reason for regarding the
contract as legally enforceable. Yet even in this situation the element of exchange is a prerequisite to legal enforceability: contract
law will not enforce a unilateral promise.8 This result is irreconcilable with the promise principle. Accordingly, Professor Fried finds
the doctrine of consideration "anomalous" and "internally inconsistent." 9 Conversely, Professor Atiyah sees consideration as "a
profoundly moral doctrine" reflecting the judgment that a promise
alone creates no moral obligation. 10
A second and related set of discrepancies between the promise
principle and contract doctrine concerns the role of the community

6. See id. at 184-202.
7. See id. at 202-15.
8. This statement is subject to the qualification that, in some circumstances, a unilateral
promise that has been relied upon may be legally enforceable. See RESTATEMENT, supra note
1, § 90. In such cases of promissory estoppel, however, the basis for enforcement is not the
promise, but the reliance. See id. comment a. See infra text accompanying notes 114-17 for
a discussion of the question whether contract law should enforce unilateral promises that

have been relied upon.
9. C. FRIED, supra note 1, at 35.
10. P. ATIYAH, supra note 4, at 3-4.

1984]

THE PROMISE MODEL OF CONTRACT

in augmenting, overriding, or modifying the obligations assumed
by contracting parties. If, as Professor Fried argues, the basis of
contractual obligation is the morally binding nature of promises,
then contract law should accord a high degree of deference to the
will of the parties as expressed in their respective promises.1 1 This
ideal finds but imperfect expression in contemporary contract doctrine. For example, the law often imposes certain duties without
regard to the wishes of the parties-notably, the duty to mitigate
damages and the duty of good faith in bargaining and in performance. In addition, courts dealing with form contracts or unconscionable contracts have been increasingly willing to disregard
terms of the contract found to be against public policy or otherwise
contrary to societal understandings of fairness."2
Other questions regarding the role of the community vis-a-vis
the will of the parties arise when the terms of a contract fail to
address subsequent problems of performance. These "contractual
accidents" include contracts predicated on mistaken assumptions
and contracts in which unanticipated difficulties have arisen. Professor Fried concedes that, in these circumstances, the promise
principle provides inadequate guidance.1 3 He proposes that the law
deal with these situations by using a "gap-filling" approach of
turning to "residuary principles of civil obligation.' 4 By emphasizing the degree to which contractual planning can avoid accidents,
and thus implicitly downplaying the prevalence of accidents, Fried
concludes that the necessity for gap-filling does not threaten the
promissory principle.1 5 Conversely, Professor Atiyah emphasizes
the frequency of accidents to demonstrate the paramount role of
community values in shaping contractual obligations.1 6
Professors Fried and Atiyah desbrve praise for their efforts.
They have expended much energy disputing the morally obligatory
nature of promises in attempting to clarify the implications of

11. See C. FRmD,supra note 1, at 17.
12. In a radical extension of this trend, a recent article by Professor Todd Rakoff argues
that contracts of adhesion should be presumptively unenforceable. See Rakoff, Contracts of
Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction,96 HARv. L. Rav. 1173, 1176 (1983).

13. C. FRIur, supra note 1, at 69.
14. Id.
15. See id. at 69-73.
16. See Atiyah, Book Review, 95 HARv. L. REv. 509, 516-20 (1981).
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their respective positions. In the end, however, the reader interested in understanding and further developing contract theory is
left with the nagging feeling that all of this energy has been expended in vain. Both scholars build their theories from the promise model of contract; both discover profound discrepancies between promise philosophy and contract doctrine. Fried uses these
discrepancies to criticize contract law while Atiyah uses them to
criticize promise philosophy. Neither scholar, however, explores
the conclusion that seems most obvious from the existence of the
discrepancies-the simple proposition that contracts are not
promises. 17
This Article examines the validity of that proposition by criticizing the promise model of contract and suggesting an alternative
model. Part I of the Article discusses three related inadequacies of
the promise model: (1) abstraction and oversimplification; (2) focus
on the fact of obligation rather than the content of obligation; and
(3) unilateralism. Because the criticisms presented in Part I are
developed with a more accurate and desirable contract model in
mind, Part II describes the general contours of this alternative
model, which is developed around the relationship between parties
to an exchange. The Article concludes by commenting on the
broad implications of the differences between the two models.
I.
A.

INADEQUACIES OF THE PROMISE MODEL

Abstraction and Oversimplification

An ineluctable result of viewing contracts as promises is to abstract and oversimplify the formation and performance of contracts, and thereby to skeletonize the rights and obligations that
flow between contractual partners. Promise philosophy typically
focuses on a promise by A to B to do phi."8 Although this simple
transaction may be suitable for developing the moral implications
generated by a promise, alone or abstract, it represents an
atrophied model of contract-a model incapable of dealing with
the issues presented by the complex relations among parties to
17. Cf. Raz, Book Review, 95 HARV. L. REv. 916, 921 (1982) (suggesting this conclusion).
18. See, e.g., MaeCormick & Raz, Voluntary Obligationsand Normative Powers, ARiSTOTEL,
Soc'Y, supp. vol. 46, at 59, 60 (1972).
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contemporary contracts. In particular, abstraction and oversimplification cause the three primary inadequacies of the promise
model: discreteness, discontinuity, and presentiation.
1.

Discreteness

Modeling contract on a simple promise from one abstract individual to another emphasizes the discreteness of a contractual
transaction.1 9 Discreteness leads one to view the transaction separately from its surrounding social context and to ignore the identities and relations of the parties. 20 This perspective in turn produces perhaps the most serious shortcoming of the promise model:
the model operates within a vacuum that induces a gross and often
complete deemphasis of the nonpromissory factors that may shape
contractual rights. Promise theories concentrate on the promise itself or the actual or likely effects of the promise as the fount of the
promisor's duties and the promisee's rights. Actually, however,
these duties and rights are created, restrained, and molded by the
interplay between the contract and the surrounding social context,
as well as by the development of the contractual relationship itself.
A relatively stable, developed society is a necessary precondition
to the genesis of the institutions of contract 21 and promising. 22 Indeed, it is an historico-anthropological truth that contracting does
not occur until division of labor and a concomitant system of ex-

19. See I. MAcNE--, CONTRACTS: EXCHANGE TRANSACTIONS
20. See L. FRDMAN, CONTRACT LAW
CoNTRACT

IN AmRICA

AND RELATIONS 12 (2d ed. 1978).
20 (1965); I. MAcNEIu, THE NEw SoCIAL

60-61 (1980); Goldberg, Toward an Expanded Economic Theory of Contract, 10

J. ECON. IssuEs 45, 49 (1976).

21. "The fundamental root, the base, of contract is society. Never has contract occurred
without society; never will it occur without society, and never can its functioning be understood isolated from its particularsociety." L MACNEM, supra note 20, at 1-2 (emphasis in
original) (footnote omitted).
22.
[I]t is wrong to think that social co-operation will not occur without the institution of promising. Indeed, as we have seen, the institution of promising is
a relatively late arrival in the development of modem societies. The fact is that
much social co-operation can take place without promising, so long as there is
a sufficient degree of trust.
P. ATIYAH, supra note 4, at 135. As Professor Atiyah argues, any institution of promising
presupposes a societal decision that promisees are entitled to the performance of promises
and that promisors are not entitled to change their minds. See id. at 127-28; Atiyah, supra
note 16, at 526.
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change have been established. 23 Persons who choose to form a contract thus approach each other not as isolated, abstract individuals, but as social actors who are already linked by the general
interdependence that results from specialization of labor and exchange.2 4 Their expectations are profoundly influenced by the social context of their transaction. Their agreement cannot be understood meaningfully without reference to trade custom,2 5 positive
law, 6 and general societal norms.2 7 Moreover, these external factors will often control the rights and obligations of the parties
without regard to the terms of their promises.
The contractual relationship itself generates additional nonpromissory sources of rights and obligations. Prior dealings between the parties may generate strong feelings of trust or expectation that trump the terms of a party's promise. 28 Furthermore,
obligations beyond the promise itself may emerge as a contractual
relationship develops. As Lon Fuller illustrates:
In a written contract an employer promises the employee at the
end of the year a bonus in addition to his regular salary. This
promise is accompanied by the words: 'It is expressly understood
by the parties hereto that the provision for a bonus herein contained shall impose no legal liability whatsoever on the employer, and that no action at law shall be brought for its recovery, it being understood that the payment of the bonus rests
entirely in the uncontrolled discretion of the employer.' There
are a considerable number of cases in the United States where
courts have ordered the employer to pay the bonus notwithstanding language like that just quoted. However it may be
qualified by words, the expectation that the bonus will be paid
enters into and conditions the parties' conduct toward one another .... 29
In short, the discreteness of the promise model hides the fact
23. See, e.g., E. DURKHEIM, ON THE DIVISION OF LABOR IN SocITY 206 (Simpson trans.
1933); see infra text accompanying notes 84-88.
24. See E. DURKHEIM, supra note 23, at 200.
25. See U.C.C. §§ 1-205(3)-(5), 2-202 (1978); see also E. DURKHEIM, supra note 23, at 215.
26. Many areas of non-contract law-antitrust law or federal anti-discrimination law, for
example-may determine contractual rights and obligations.
27. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-302 (1978).
28. See, e.g., id. §§ 1-205(3), 2-207(3).
29. L. FULLER, ANATOMY OF THE LAW 81 (1968).
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that trust, expectations, and accompanying obligations may arise
from a variety of sources other than the parties' promises, such as
the general interdependence between members of a developed society, the customs and norms of the particular business or social
community, similar or previous transactions, or the developing relationship between the parties. 30 One might be able to force a
promissory structure upon such expectations, but this structure
would be artificial and frequently fictitious. Alternatively, asserting
that these sources of right and obligation are noncontractual because they are nonpromissory entails explaining contemporary contract doctrine through some "gap-filling" approach such as that
propounded by Professor Fried.3 1 Any approach along these lines is
doomed ultimately to demonstrate the relatively insignificant role
32
of promise in contract law.
The discreteness of promises is also responsible for the "infinite
regress" problem in promise philosophy. This problem concerns
the question why a promisee is entitled to the promised performance and why his expectation of receiving the promised performance is a legitimate one. H.A. Prichard provides the classic statement of the problem: "[P]romising to do this or that action, in the
ordinary sense of promising, can only exist among individuals between whom there has already been something which looks like an
agreement to keep agreements . . . . If one seeks to determine
how promising can get underway between abstract individuals in a
state of nature, the infinite regress is an insurmountable obstacle. 4

30. I. MACNEIL, supra note 20, at 74-75; cf. Farnsworth, The Past of Promise:An Historical Introduction to Contract, 69 COLUM. L. REv. 576, 604-05 (1969) (quoting W. GOLDSCHMIDT, SEBEI LAW 221 (1967):
[Within the Sebei tribe, s]uch force as promises have is "ensured by mutual

interdependence, by the operation of a market in which each party to the contract had an ultimate interest in preserving his public reputation; his very survival in the community, and certainly his social and economic advancement,
depended on his fulfilling the legitimate obligations he had incurred.").

31. See, e.g., C. FRID, supra note 1, at 69-73, 89-90.
32. See Atiyah, supra note 16, at 516; see infra text accompanying notes 49-50.
33. H.A. PRICHARD, MORAL OBLIGATION 179 (1949); see also Robins, The Primacy of
Promising,85 MIND 321, 336 (1976) (expectations that a promisor will conform to the practice of promising cannot be basis for promissory obligation because "any such expectations
...presuppose an antecedent motivation to conform to the practice").
34. See P. ATIYAH, supra note 4, at 128 ("[A] vicious circle is inescapable so long as we
confine our attention to the promisor himself.").
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If one's inquiry concerns contractual obligation, however, the problem is irrelevant. Once one assumes the prior existence of specialization of labor, mutual interdependence, and a system of exchange
governed by the norm of reciprocity,3 5 it is not difficult to envision
the emergence of a practice of making contracts without any antecedent "agreement to keep agreements." Parties to a contract will
entertain expectations of performance that are prior to and independent of any belief in the moral obligation to keep promises.
This critical sociological fact is hopelessly obscured by the discrete
view of contracts under the promise model.
2. Discontinuity
The abstraction and simplicity of the promise paradigm create a
model of contract as a transaction with rigid and easily discernible
boundaries, a transaction that "commences sharply by clear, instantaneous agreement and terminates sharply by clear, instantaneous performance." 38 This vision may be appropriate for highly
discrete contracts, which closely resemble the promise paradigm.
Often in modern contractual relationships, however, neither the
commencement nor the performance of the contract occurs with
one specific, identifiable event.3 7 Regarding the formation of a contract, the distinction between a promise and a set of assurances
given in contract negotiations is difficult to demarcate: when a
party makes one assurance after another, exactly when has that
party consented to a contractual relationship?3 8 Similarly,
35. The primal role of the norm of reciprocity is discussed below. See infra text accompa-

nying notes 70-77.
36. I. MACNmiL, supra note 20, at 15; see C. FRIED, supra note 1, at 113 ("Whether or not
a person has promised is a yes or no question."); id. at 120-21.
37. Cf. Atiyah, supra note 16, at 520 (Fried's justification of discontinuities "falls back on
the oversimple paradigm ... and neglects cases of interpretation and difficulty").
38. The example in the text derives from Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores, Inc., 26 Wis. 2d
683, 133 N.W.2d 267 (1965). In that case, the plaintiffs sold their previous business and
incurred other expenses at the request of the defendant, who repeatedly assured them that

it would establish the plaintiffs as one of its franchisees. The parties eventually terminated
their negotiations without completing the transaction. The Wisconsin Supreme Court affirmed a verdict for the plaintiffs on the basis of the doctrine of promissory estoppel: "A
promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance of a
definite and substantial character on the part of the promisee and which does induce such
action or forbearance is binding if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the
promise." Id. at 694, 133 N.W.2d at 273 (quoting RESTATEMENT (FIRsT) oF CormACTS § 90
(1932)). Professor Fried agrees with the court's result, but finds its reasoning incorrect-
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promises and statements of intent differ only in degree.3 9 Regarding performance of a contract, only gradual differences exist be-

tween what constitutes "substantial performance" (entitling the
performer to insist on his rights under the contract) and what does
not.40 These distinctions become especially blurred in an ongoing
contractual relationship. Yet, under the promise model, these distinctions trigger drastically different legal consequences, a result
that can hardly be defended as rational when the controlling facts
differ by only a slight degree.4 1 Lines must occasionally be drawn,
but there should be flexibility in the lines. The promise model is
incapable of generating this flexibility.
3.

Presentiation

By deemphasizing or even disregarding nonpromissory sources of
rights and obligations, the promise model requires that the future
duties of the parties be determined in the present act of promising.
The promise model thus seeks to bring all future contract relations
into the present-to presentiate the contract.42 Because it is imThe award of reliance damages was not a case of enforcement of a promise at
all, since the parties had not reached the stage where clearly determined
promises had been made. Reliance damages were awarded because Red Owl
had not dealt fairly with Hoffman. It had allowed him to incur expenses based
on hopes that Red Owl knew or should have known were imprudent and that
Red Owl was not prepared to permit him to realize.
C. F=ID, supra note 1, at 24. Professor Fried neglects to explain the distinction between a
promise and Red Owl's specific representations that it would establish the plaintiffs as a
franchise operator of a Red Owl store in a particular location by a particular time. Any such
distinction is at best elusive, at worst disingenuous.
39. P. ATiYAH, supra note 4, at 165-66; see S. WnmsToN, supra note 1, § 1A; cf. Greiner
v. Greiner, 131 Kan. 760, 764, 293 P. 759, 762 (1930) ("Ritual scrupulousness is not required
[to make a promise] and, generally, any manifestation, by words or conduct or both, which
the promisee is justified in understanding as an expression of intention to make a promise,
is sufficient.").
40. See C. FRmD, supra note 1, at 120.

41. Professor Fried's response-that there is no irrationality in this outcome because we
are within the realm of deontological morality, see id. at 132, 154 n.1-is symptomatic of the
abstraction and oversimplicity of the promise model. It is totally artificial to posit any discrete moral difference between the actions of the defendant in Red Owl and those of any
common promise-breaker. See supra note 38.
42. .MAcN~zn, supra note 20, at 19; see Goldberg, supra note 20, at 49; see also C.
FRED, supra note 1, at 13-14 ('Your commitment puts your future performance into my
hands in the present just as my commitment puts my future performance into your hands.
A future exchange is transformed into a present exchange.").
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possible for contracting parties to predict and account for all future contingencies, 43 a promise can embody only a fragment of any
contractual relationship. 44 As a result, the promise model is incapable of dealing satisfactorily with long-term, ongoing contractual relationships and with unanticipated circumstances.
Because it combines presentiation with discreteness, the promise
model tends to address all questions of performance under the rubric of consent: 45 discreteness sifts out nonconsensual determinants of contractual responsibility, and presentiation collects all
future duties into a neat package to which each party can give present assent. Consent may be an adequate basis for determining the
duties of parties to a short-term, limited contract. As the length
and complexity of the contractual relationship increase, however,
the limited availability of information about the future and the
constant state of flux that characterizes contemporary society take
their toll. In such long-term relationships, "consent can play no
more than some kind of a triggering role[;I equating consent to the
full scope of complex planning is downright silly."4 6
Likewise, the promise model encounters difficulty in resolving issues raised by unforeseen situations, even in the context of shortterm contracts. Presentiation requires all future contingencies to
be anticipated by the parties' promises. 7 To allow contract law to

43. See E. DURKHEIM, supra note 23, at 213; I. MACNEm, supra note 20, at 8.
44. See I. MACNEIL, supra note 20, at 8-9; cf. E. DURKHEIM, supra note 23, at 214 ("[I]f we
were linked only by the terms of our contracts, as they are agreed upon, only a precarious
solidarity would result.").
45. This tendency is well illustrated by Professor Fried's treatment of mistake and frustration. Under Fried's analysis, both of these problems result from a failure of agreement
between the parties. See C. FRIED, supra note 1,at 59-60. The presentiation of contractual
duties and the consequently bloated role of consent in promissory analysis cause Fried to
overlook a fundamental difference between the two problems: mistake concerns a factual
assumption that is erroneous at the time of contract formation; frustration relates to a difficulty arising after contract formation that was not foreseen when the contract was made.
This distinction implicates differences in analysis of the two problems. Generally, because a
mistaken agreement is really no agreement, resolution of a mistake situation should be influenced more by notions of fairness than by the terms of the parties' contract. Conversely,
because contractual relationships are aimed at planning future action, a situation of frustration may be resolved more appropriately according to the risk allocation of the parties'
contract.
46. 1.MACNEm, supra note 20, at 49-50; see P. ATIYAH, supra note 4, at 150-51.
47. See I. MAcNEiL, supra note 20, at 19, 62.
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depart from the terms of the promises in resolving unforeseen situations would be to admit the influence of nonpromissory factors
and thereby to undermine the basis of the promise model. Thus,
unanticipated circumstances can be addressed within the promise
model in two ways. One approach brings the circumstances within
the promises through the use of some legal fiction-for example,
presuming that the parties would have intended a certain result
had they considered the situation at hand. This method, fictionalizing intent, has been discredited.4" The other approach denies
that resolving this type of problem is ii matter of contract law. Professor Fried employs this method:
The further courts are from the boundary between interpretation and interpolation, the further they are from the moral basis
of the promise principle and the more palpably are they imposing an agreement.
[W]hen relations between parties are not governed by the actual promises they have made, they are governed by residual
49
general principles of law.
Though logically coherent, such a "gap-filling" methodology is
an unacceptable approach to contract law. If one concedes that
contemporary contracts are generally long-term, complicated arrangements, one must recognize that unforeseen situations are a
normal occurrence in contractual relationships. Disavowing the applicability of contract law in these situations relegates that law to a
subsidiary role in contractual relationships. 50 Furthermore, the
gap-filling approach ignores the possibility that, because parties
have formed a contractual relationship, it may be inappropriate to
apply, for example, tort rules to an admittedly unanticipated situation.5 1 Professor Fried recognizes as much in discussing the role of
48. See C. FRIED, supra note 1, at 60-61.
49. Id. at 61, 69.
50. See Atiyah, supra note 16, at 516.
51. See Note, DisengagingSales Law from the Sale Construct:A Proposalto Extend the
Scope of Article 2 of the UCC, 96 HARv. L. REv. 470, 477 n.42 (1982) (criticizing application
of strict tort liability, rather than implied warranty provisions of article 2, to lease of defective goods). General tort rules may be inappropriate or may require modification in the
context of other, noncontractual relationships as weli. For example, the rules concerning
assault and battery cannot be applied straightforwardly to the situation of a parent's disci-
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the principle of sharing:
By engaging in a contractual relation A and B become no longer
strangers to each other. They stand closer than those who are
merely members of the same political community..., they are
joined in a common enterprise, and therefore they have some
obligation to share unexpected benefits and losses in the case of
an accident in the course of that enterprise. 52
The sentiment expressed in this passage is sound, but not true to
the promise model.
In short, "promise" is just too simple and abstract an idea to
serve meaningfully as the primary conceptual tool for analyzing
contractual relationships. Thinking of contracts as promises leads
one to ignore nonpromissory sources of rights and obligations, to
assume that contracts begin and end with specific, identifiable
events, and to force all future contractual duties into the present
act of consent. The resulting view of contracts is unrealistic when
compared with most modern contractual relationships. It is too
rigid and simplified a view to serve as a foundation for the development of contract theory and doctrine.
B. Focus on the Fact, Rather than the Content, of Obligation
Instead of examining the substance of the obligation that results
from a binding promise, promissory analysis tends to focus exclusively on the issue whether a binding promise has been made.53
The analysis assumes that the content of the obligation simply
mirrors the promise.5 4 For two reasons, this aspect of promissory
plining a child.
52. C. FRIED, supra note 1, at 72.
53. For example, Professor Atiyah's conception of promise as admission relates only to
the binding nature of the promise and the conclusive nature of its terms. See P. ATIYAH,
supra note 4, at 178-79. The conception provides no guidance in dealing with many difficult
issues that arise after the formation of a contract, such as the scope of good faith in
performance.
54. See, e.g., C. FRIED, supra note 1, at 19, 113; H.A. PRICHARD, supra note 33, at 169.
This assumption is a result of the discreteness that is characteristic of promissory analysis:
In determining the content of a transaction, discreteness calls for strictly
limiting the sources of. . . the substantive content of the transaction, in order
to sharpen the focus as much as possible. ...
Closely related to the foregoing is the need to equate the substance of the
transaction with the promises, the consensual planning, creating it.
I. MACNEL, supra note 20, at 61-62.
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analysis makes the promise model an undesirable basis for contract
theory. First, as a general matter, the significance of the fact of
obligation is wholly contingent on the content of the obligation.
Second, in shifting from promise (a philosophical notion) to contract (a legal creation), the promise model fallaciously assumes
that particular legal rights logically imply particular legal
remedies.
A binding promise signifies nothing until one knows the consequences of being bound. Even if one concedes that a simple promise by A to B to do phi entails an obligation to do phi,5" the content of the obligation becomes increasingly unclear as one departs
from this simple paradigm. With impossible promises," promises
of fact,5 7 and promises about the future conduct of a third party,58
the content of the promissory obligation cannot be extracted as a
necessary logical implication of the terms of the promise. Moreover, the content of the promise itself is indeterminate in some instances, such as when extremely long and complicated written contracts are imperfectly understood by one or even both parties."
Finally, promises alone inadequately delineate contractual obligations both in nondiscrete contractual relationships and in unanticipated contractual situations.6 In all of these circumstances, the
content of obligation takes priority over the fact of obligation. The
truth of this assertion is especially apparent in situations in which
there is little or no content to a party's promissory obligations. For
example, when a party breaches an executory contract but there
has been no change in the market, the nonbreaching party has suffered no economic injury and can recover only nominal damages.
In such a case, whether a binding promise has been made is simply
irrelevant.
In shifting from the realm of philosophical discourse to the
realm of legal doctrine, a more fundamental error arises in the no55. Even this simple assertion is, of course, a subject of intense debate. See, e.g., H.A.
PRICHARD, supra note 33; MacCormick & Raz, supra note 18; Robins, supra note 33.
56. See P. ATiYAH, supra note 4, at 155-57.
57. See id. at 161-64; O.W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAw 299 (1881).
58. See P. ATiYAH, supra note 4, at 164-65; O.W. HOLMES, supra note 57, at 299.

59. See P. ATriYAH, supra note 4, at 148-49; Atiyah, supra note 16, at 516-17.
60. See supra notes 18-52 and accompanying text.
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tion that the content of obligation mirrors the promise. This notion is the traditional justification for the expectation measure of
damages; the measure is seen as the monetary equivalent of the
promised performance. 1 But contract is a legal creation and,
therefore, the rights and obligations that emanate from a contract
cannot be articulated without reference to the legal remedies protecting those rights and enforcing those obligations.6 2 Hence it is
fallacious to argue that a particular remedy flows naturally from a
particular right. For example, a person who contracts that it will
rain tomorrow has clearly "promised" that, if it does not rain, he
will submit to whatever sanction the law imposes.6" This is a simple case, but every contracting party intends in a very loose sense
4
the legal consequences of a breach on his part.
Furthermore, the law imposes many obligations and ignores
many promises without regard to the intentions of the contracting
parties. For instance, a manufacturer's disclaimer of liability for a
personal injury caused by a defect in his product is ineffective in
most jurisdictions.6 5 Thus, a buyer's "promise" not to sue for such

61. See, e.g., C. FRiED, supra note 1, at 17.
62. See Fuller & Perdue, The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages (Pt. 1), 46 YALE
L.J. 52, 52-53 (1936); Atiyah, supra note 16, at 519. As Professor Atiyah has noted,
American Legal Realism is generally credited with having demonstrated that
concepts used by lawyers have no 'natural' meaning or delimitation. If the law
uses the concept of 'promise' then what is a promise is a matter for legal definition.... [O]ne cannot draw from a concept, even though it is in current
use, necessary legal conclusions unless one has first put the premisses into the
concept.
P. ATIYAH, supra note 4, at 27. Similarly, whereas Professor Fried asserts that "[t]he moral
force of a promise cannot depend on whether the promisee chooses to 'enforce' the promise," C. FRiED, supra note 1, at 41, he fails to see that the moral content of the promise will
depend on what society considers satisfaction of the obligation.
63. P. AriYAH, supra note 4, at 57 n.36; O.W. HOLMES, supra note 57, at 299. The positive
role of remedy in defining contractual right is especially strong because of the doctrine of
Hadley v. Baxendale, 9 Exch. 341, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854), which limits consequential
damages for breach of contract to reasonably foreseeable damages. See Fuller & Perdue,
supra note 62, at 85; cf. G. GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 53 (1974) (discussing manipulability of the,Hadley standard of foreseeability).
64. See C. FRiED, supra note 1, at 38 ("[For a promise to be binding, the] promisor must
have been serious enough that subsequent legal enforcement was an aspect of what he
should have contemplated at the time he promised.") (footnote omitted); cf. P. ATIYAH,
supra note 4, at 151 ("[T]he total consequences of the promise are an elaborate mesh of the
actual words used (particularly written words) and of the law.").
65. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment m (1963-1964).
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an injury is often, legally, no promise at all. Because of its simplistic notion that the content of contractual obligation mirrors the
terms of the contract, the promise model focuses all attention on
the fact of obligation rather than the substance of obligation. For
this reason, the model is an unserviceable tool for identifying the
rights and duties that a contract creates.
C.

Unilateralism

The promise model emphasizes the individual, isolated promise
as the basic unit from which contracts are constructed. Because it
combines this emphasis with the unidirectional flow of obligation
under a promise, the promise model produces a unilateralistic vision of contractual duty. This vision is undesirable for two reasons:
it obscures reciprocity, the central norm of contractual relationships; and it induces a fragmented view of the obligations of contracting parties.
Any theory that views contracts as composed of separable
promises relies upon a complimentarity, rather than a reciprocity,
of rights and obligations. The distinction between complementar.ity and reciprocity can be summarized in the following manner: 66
In a situation of complementarity1. a right (x) of A against B implies a duty (x') of B to A;
or
2. a duty (x') of B to A implies a right (x) of A against B.
In a situation of reciprocity)
1. a right (x) of A against B implies a duty (y') of A to B;
or
2. a duty (x') of B to A implies a right (y) of B against A.
Thus, in a scheme of complementarity "one [party's] rights are
[the other party's] obligations, and vice-versa. '1 7 Complementarity
is the basis of contractual obligation under the promise model because the structure of a promise is one of obligation by promisor in
66. What follows in the text is a paraphrase of Gouldner, The Norm of Reciprocity: A
PreliminaryStatement, 25 AM. Soc. Rav. 161, 168-69 (1960).
67. Id. at 169.
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favor of promisee."e In contrast, a relationship based upon reciprocity posits that each party has rights and obligations; receipt
and delivery of performance are mutually contingent.6 9
Reliance on complementarity rather than reciprocity is another
serious defect of the promise model. Reciprocity is a critically important social norm70 underlying and enabling the development of
71
specialization of labor and an accompanying system of exchange.
As the conception of contract crystallized around the relationship
between parties to an exchange,7 2 the norm of reciprocity continued to remain at the heart of the relationship. From that position
reciprocity exercises a key role in stabilizing the relationship, for it
makes the gratification of each party's needs contingent upon satisfaction of the other party's needs.7 3 Additionally, reciprocity furnishes a basis upon which a contractual relationship can adjust to
contingencies that could not have been foreseen at the time of contract formation. 4 Complementarity, on the other hand, exerts a
destabilizing influence:
If assumptions about egoistic dispositions are valid ... a complementarity of rights and obligations should be exposed to a
persistent strain, in which each party is somewhat more actively
concerned to defend or extend his own rights than those of
others. There is nothing in complementarity as such which
75
would seem able to control egoism.
The norm of reciprocity finds expression in numerous areas of
68. See H.A.

PiucHAmD,

supra note 33, at 169.

69. Gouldner, supra note 66, at 169.
70. See, e.g., L. FULLER, THE MoRALrry OF LAW 20 (1964) (society is "held together by a
pervasive bond of reciprocity"); L. HOBHOUSE, MoRALs IN EVOLUTION: A STUDY IN COMPARArIva ETHIcS 12 (1906) ("[R]eciprocity ... is the vital principle of society."); G. SIMmEL, THE
SOCIOLOGY OF GEORG SimmEL 387 (Wolff trans. & ed. 1950) (social equilibrium and cohesion
could not exist without "reciprocity of service and return service").
71. Gouldner, supra note 66, at 169-70.
72. See infra text accompanying notes 84-100.
73. See Gouldner, supra note 66, at 167-68.
74. Fuller notes that parties sometimes deliberately leave contractual terms ambiguous
with the expectation that those terms will become more definite as the relationship develops. "This they do because they cannot in advance foresee just what kind of reciprocal
accommodation on the matters in issue will best serve their respective interests and advance
their shared desire to achieve a workable frame of collaboration." L. FULLER, supra note 29,
at 77.
75. Gouldner, supra note 66, at 173; see also L MACNEIL, supra note 20, at 45.
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contract law. The most obvious expression is the doctrine of consideration. According to Holmes,
[I]t is the essence of a consideration, that, by the terms of the
agreement, it is given and accepted as the motive or inducement
of the promise. Conversely, the promise must be made and accepted as the conventional motive or inducement for furnishing
the consideration. The root of the whole matter is the relation of
reciprocal conventional inducement, each for the other, be76
tween consideration and promise.
Perhaps because of the stabilizing role of the norm of reciprocity,
the law generally has not recognized a mere promise, absent consideration, as capable of generating contractual obligations.
Rather, the law has always required that the promise be part of a
mutual exchange.77 Related doctrines, such as the requirement of
mutuality of obligation and the refusal to enforce a "nude pact,"
echo this theme. The duty to mitigate damages and other duties of
cooperation also embody the norm of reciprocity. Although these
two sets of doctrine-consideration and cooperation-are both
central to the law of contracts, they are anomalous to the promise
model. The doctrine of consideration reflects the principle that a
promise alone is not enough to create contractual obligations. Duties of cooperation show that the law imposes obligations beyond
the parties' promises in order to strengthen and stabilize the contractual relationship.
Another shortcoming of the promise model that results from
unilateralism is the model's tendency to separate and isolate the
duties of contracting parties, rather than to view the contractual
relationship as a single organic unit. Professor Fried's conception
of good faith in performance demonstrates this tendency: "[G]ood
faith requires not loyalty to some undefined relationship but only
loyalty to the promise itself-the faithful carrying out of the mutual promises that the parties, having come to understand their
separate purposes, choose to exchange. 7 8 Such an attitude creates
76. O.W. HOLMES, supra note 57, at 293-94 (emphasis added).
77. See P. ATPmAH, supra note 4, at 2-3 (English common law); H. MAINE, Ancient Law
320-37 (16th ed. 1897) (Roman law); see also T. HOas, LEVIATHmAN 87 (Oakeshott ed. 1957)
(distinguishing contract from promise on basis that contract involves mutual exchange).
78. C. FRIED, supra note 1, at 88 (emphasis in original).
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difficulties for the promise model when unforeseen obstacles arise
to inhibit performance. Consider the highly criticized rule that unilateral modification of a contract in light of unanticipated difficulties requires "fresh" consideration.79 Critics often lay the blame for
this rule on the doctrine of consideration. 0 The chief culprit, however, may not be consideration but rather the fragmentation of
contractual duties induced by the promise model. This fragmentary attitude toward contractual duties makes the modification appear as a separate promise rather than as an adjustment within the
contractual relationship. A holistic view of contract as a unitary
relationship would not require new consideration for such an adjustment; it would find consideration in the exchange upon which
the relationship was based.81
To summarize Part I of this Article, it is worth emphasizing the
significant degree to which the three inadequacies discussed in this
Part reinforce each other. Abstraction and oversimplification
screen out nonpromissory determinants of contractual rights and
obligations and thus cause the promise model to focus on promise
as the sole determinant of obligation. This focus causes the model
not only to adopt the simplistic and fallacious notion that content
of obligation mirrors the promise, but also to conceive of contract
in terms of component promises. These two effects in turn lead the
promise model to view contractual obligations as characterized by
rigidity and discontinuity, a view which supports presentiation and
further simplification of rights and duties.
II.

AN ALTERNATIVE MODEL: CONTRACT AS EXCHANGE
RELATIONSHIP

The promise model of contract is an abstract and simplistic con79. See Levine v. Blumenthal, 117 N.J.L. 23, 186 A. 457 (Sup. Ct. 1936), aff'd per curiam,
117 N.J.L. 389, 189 A. 54 (1937). The Restatement (Second) of Contracts repudiates this
rule. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 89.
80. See, e.g., C. FRiMD, supra note 1, at 33-36.

81. Fragmentation can also be found in the doctrines summarized in §§ 73-77 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts. These sections enumerate rules for determining when a
particular act-e.g., performance of a legal duty-constitutes consideration. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, §§ 73-77. Rather than focusing on such discrete acts, contract law
should inquire whether there is consideration (and therefore a reciprocity of relations) in
the relationship as a whole.
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struct that implies rigidly defined rights and obligations and that
fails to account for reciprocal relations among contracting parties.
The model cannot deal with the complex and ongoing nature of
most contemporary contractual relationships and is a defective
conceptual tool for understanding much of current contract doctrine. This Part describes a more accurate conception of contract-contract as the relationship that exists and develops among
82
parties who have made a commitment to a future exchange.
As used here, "exchange" does not signify discrete exchange, but
exchange in the broad sense, encompassing any form of contemplated collaboration that involves a reciprocity of rights and obligations 83 The paradigm of this model is an ongoing, developing
relationship-such as the relationship between a union and a corporate management, or between two merchants engaging in continuous business dealings. This kind of relationship has boundaries
that are both porous and continuous and an obligational structure
that is shaped not only by the parties' wills but also by nonconsensual factors. Section A of this Part reviews the historical development of contract to demonstrate the origin of contract in exchange.
Section B then outlines the general characteristics of the exchangerelationship model. Section C concludes this Part by noting a few
limitations of this model.
A.

The Development of Contract

The legal concept of contract is rooted in the exchange relationship. In Roman law the contractual transaction emerged as a variation of the sale transaction. As traced in Sir Henry Sumner
Maine's Ancient Law, this emergence occurred in three stages."
82. French law has a similar concept, "achalandage," which embraces "the sum of all
relations created between a business man and his customers." Derenberg, The Influence of
the French Code Civil on the Modern Law of Unfair Competition, 4 AM. J. Comp. L. 1, 4
(1955) (quoting WAELBROECK, CouRs DE DRorr bwusTmR. (1863-1867)). This concept, how-

ever, is used not to regulate the relations between the businessman and his customers, but
to protect those relations from interference from other merchants. See id. The analogy to
the exchange-relationship model of contract is therefore imperfect.
83. See L. FULLER, supra note 29, at 72; see also L MAcNEML, supra note 20, at 86 (modern contractual relationships "involve a flow of exchanges, or often many flows at the same
time, occurring in complex patterns not lending themselves to divisions into discrete
periods").
84. See H. MAINE, supra note 77, at 315-37.
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Early Roman law conflated contract and sale. Both were conceptualized as the same transaction; they were seen as a simple and simultaneous exchange of property for money. The second stage
marked the beginning of the divergence between contract and sale.
In this stage the law came to recognize the credit transaction, a
conveyance of property in return for a promise to pay. As Maine
notes, "Contract was long regarded as an incomplete conveyance."815 The culmination of the law of contract occurred in the
third stage, in which legal enforceability was conferred upon the
bilateral executory contract.
The English common law of contract developed not from the incomplete conveyance but from the tort action of trespass on the
case.88 Despite this tort background, the basis of the contractual
action was exchange: the special action of assumpsit (a variety of
trespass on the case) was predicated upon misfeasance in the performance of an undertaking.8 7 By the second half of the fifteenth
century, assumpsit had been expanded to allow suit for nonfeasance, and at the end of the sixteenth century the action came to
include bilateral executory agreements.88
The wholly executory contract is the closest that contract law
has come to embracing the promise principle.8 9 Thus, when wholly
executory contracts became legally enforceable, contract appeared
to be on the verge of slipping its exchange moorings: the next logical step would have been legal recognition of unitary promises. In
both Roman and English law, however, consideration became a basic requirement of enforceability precisely at this time.90
This development was no coincidence, for exchange is the essence of the doctrine of consideration. 91 A traditional formulation
of the doctrine defines consideration in terms of benefit to promisor or detriment to promisee.9 2 This bifurcated definition is a bas-

85. Id. at 321 (emphasis omitted).
86. See G. GILMORE, supra note 63, at 140 n.228; Farnsworth, supra note 30, at 594-95.

87. Farnsworth, supra note 30, at 594.
88. See id. at 594-96.
89. See supra text accompanying notes 8-9.
90. See H. MAINE, supra note 77, at 337 (Roman law); Farnsworth, supra note 30, at 598
(English law).
91. See J. DAWSON, GIFTs AND PROMISES (1980); Farnsworth, supra note 30, at 598.
92. E.g., S. WILLISTON, supra note 1, §§ 99-100, 102-104.
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tardization of the core notion of consideration as exchange 3 insofar as the definition acknowledges consideration in unbargainedfor reliance stemming from a non-exchange situation. 4 Similarly,
use of the doctrine of consideration to exclude options and modifications of existing arrangements has been correctly identified as an
inappropriate extension of the doctrine, because both options and
modifications occur in the context of an exchange.9 5
Professor Fried's criticism of the doctrine turns on the inconsistency between the requirement of an exchange and the proposition
that "[t]he law is not at all interested in the adequacy of the consideration." ' But the latter proposition is not a logical outgrowth
of the notion of consideration; rather, it is the accomplishment of
the movement of late-nineteenth-century jurists (notably Holmes)
to objectify legal doctrine.9 7 It conflicts fundamentally with the exchange basis of contract and should be discarded. By making exchange the basis of contractual obligation,98 the doctrine of consideration restricts legal enforceability to situations of reciprocity. 9
This restriction necessitates inquiry into the substantiality of the

93. Cf. Farnsworth, supra note 30, at 598 (bifurcated formulation has proved less durable
than notion of exchange).
94. See, e.g., Allegheny College v. National Chautauqua County Bank, 246 N.Y. 369, 37374, 159 N.E. 173, 175 (1927) ("[Tlhere has grown up . . a doctrine that a substitute for
consideration or an exception to its ordinary requirements can be found in what is styled 'a
promissory estoppel.' . . . [W]e have adopted the doctrine of promissory estoppel as the
equivalent of consideration in connection with our law of charitable subscriptions."). The
Restatement has wisely avoided the bifurcated definition of consideration in favor of a notion of consideration as exchange. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, §§ 71, 79. Promissory
estoppel, which allows enforcement of a promise that has been relied upon even if the promise is not part of an exchange, is treated under the topic "Contracts Without Consideration." See id. §§ 82-94.
95. RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 87 comment b, § 89 comment a.
96. C. FrED, supra note 1, at 29; see id. at 35. But see REsTATEmENT, supra note 1, § 71
comment b ("[A] mere pretense of bargain does not suffice, as where.., the purported
consideration is merely nominal."); id. § 79 comment c ("Ordinarily, therefore, courts do
not inquire into the adequacy of consideration ....
Gross inadequacy of consideration may
be relevant to issues of capacity, fraud and the like, but the requirement of consideration is
not a safeguard against imprudent and improvident contracts except in cases where it appears that there is no bargain in fact.") (emphasis added).
97. See G. GmmoRE, supra note 63, at 41-45.
98. See A.W.B. SIMPSON, A HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAw OF CoNTRAcr 456-57, 491
(1975); cf. P. ATiAH, supra note 4, at 193 ("[T]he promise is usually evidence that the
transaction is an exchange and not a gift .... ).
99. See supra text accompanying notes 76-77.
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exchange."' °
B.

Characteristicsof the Exchange-Relationship Model'

In contrast to the rigidity and simplicity of the promise model,
the exchange-relationship model views contractual relationships as
flexible, adaptable, and capable of incorporating rights and obligations from sources other than the promises of the parties. This alternative model not only presents a more accurate picture of modern contracts, but also provides a more powerful vehicle for the
creation and sustenance of contractual relationships in contemporary society. This Section outlines the structural characteristics of
the alternative model and then briefly discusses the sources of obligation under that model.
The exchange-relationship model focuses on the long-term contract as the paradigm of contractual relationships. Because of the
limited availability of information about the future and the tendency of socioeconomic conditions to fluctuate, the model recognizes that a contractual relationship, to survive, must incorporate a
capacity for adapting to changing conditions. 1 02 The model conse-

quently posits a two-staged process for the delineation of rights
100. For example, in Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 198 A.2d 914 (D.C.
1964), a furniture company had structured the installment sales contract between it and a
welfare mother in such a way that the company retained title to all goods purchased from it
as long as there was an outstanding balance due on any one item. The company's agents also
permitted Mrs. Williams to purchase an expensive stereo system, which they knew she could
not afford, at a time when she was close to eliminating her outstanding balance. After Mrs.
Williams defaulted on her installment payments, the company brought a replevin action to
repossess all of the goods she had purchased from the company. The court of appeals condemned the company's conduct, but affirmed the trial court's judgment for the company
nonetheless.
This holding is unfaithful to the doctrine of consideration and the principle of exchange
upon which that doctrine rests. The court should have scrutinized the substantiality of the
purported exchange. Although at a purely formal level the contract appeared to contain
consideration, the relationship between seller and buyer was really one of bald exploitation
rather than one of reciprocity based on exchange. The court should have voided the contract
for lack of sufficient consideration.
101. As with much of the criticism presented in the first Section of Part I, discussion of
the characteristics of this model of contract draws heavily from the work of Ian Macneil.
See I. MACNE L, supra note 19; I. MAcNm, supra note 20; Macneil, The Many Futures of
Contracts,47 S. CAL. L. RaV. 691 (1974). This Section is deliberately abbreviated to avoid
repetition of points examined in the first Part of the Article.
102. See I. MAcNEL, supra note 20, at 50-51.
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and obligations: (1) the initial, tentative definition; and (2) the
continual adjustment of the relationship to unanticipated circumstances that occur as the future unfolds. 03 The model also recognizes that in many long-term contractual relationships, such as
that created among stockholders by a corporate charter, individuals or entities may enter and exit the relationship while the relationship continues. This view of contract requires that the law take
a flexible approach to contractual duties and, thus, that the rigidity and discontinuity of rights under the promise model be
rejected.
Whereas the promise model treats the wills of the parties as the
nearly exclusive source of obligation under contract, the exchangerelationship model recognizes three general sources of obligation:
sources external to the relationship, the consent of the parties, and
the relationship itself. Because the alternative model treats contract as a socio-legal relationship, it easily accounts for the controlling manner in which society and law shape contractual relationships. The model recognizes that general societal norms of fairness
and reciprocity, positive law, and trade custom will qualify and
even vitiate obligations assumed by contracting parties, and will
1 4
impose obligations beyond those assumed by the parties. 0
Although the exchange-relationship model thus accords a diminished role to consent as a determinant of rights and obligations,
consent still performs a vital function in triggering obligation.105
The alternative model sees the contractual relationship as essentially voluntary, in contrast with pure status relationships. In a
pure status relationship, such as that between parent and child, 108
duties are based wholly on a position that cannot be divested vol103. See id. at 24-26; Unger, The CriticalLegal Studies Movement, 96 HARv. L. REv. 561,
639-40 (1983). Of course, the initial definition may embrace procedures for structuring future adjustments. An example of such an arrangement is the establishment of an arbitration
procedure.
104. See generally P. ATnYAH, supra note 4, at 130 ("We thus find a decline in the belief
that the individual has the right to determine what obligations he is going to assume, and an

increased strength in the belief that the social group has the right to impose its own solution
on its members, dissent as they may.").

105. See I. MAcNEm, supra note 20, at 50; cf. P. ATIYAu,
("[P]romising may be reducible to a species of consent ....

supra note 4, at 177

).

106. See E. DulrKHmM, supra note 23, at 207; L. FuiiER, supra note 70, at 24.
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untarily.107 Besides triggering obligation, consent may also shape
the content of that obligation.108 This shaping function, however, is
not a necessary characteristic of a contractual relationship. Because the exchange-relationship model recognizes the influence of
external sources in defining contractual obligation, it must assert
that no sharp distinction exists between a contract in which the
parties have significant freedom to define their obligations and one
in which the obligations are defined almost entirely (though not
triggered) by nonconsensual factors. An example of the latter type
of contractual relationship is marriage in nineteenth-century Anglo-American society. Consent was required to become married;
yet, once married, the responsibilities of each partner were defined
by law and custom. 10 9 Thus, consent played a vital role in triggering obligation but a trivial role in shaping it. In this respect, then,
the exchange-relationship model downplays the shaping function
of consent. Nevertheless, the emphasis that the model places on
the capacity to respond to unforeseen circumstances dictates that
consent play a significant shaping role in most contractual
relationships. 110
The relationship itself may also be a source of contractual obli107. See Gouldner, supra note 66, at 170; Pound, The End of Law as Developed in Juristic Thought (Pt. 2), 30 HARv. L. REv. 201, 211 (1917). Sir Henry Maine's thesis is that, as a
society progresses, individual obligation becomes decreasingly status-based (one's status being defined largely by family and social position) and increasingly contract-based. See H.
MAINE, supra note 77, at 168-70.
108. The distinction between triggering obligation and shaping obligation may underlie
Joseph Raz's distinction between promises and other voluntary obligations. See Raz, supra
note 17, at 930-33.
109. Similarly, Durkheim has described cultures in which individuals could freely enter
into and exit from various family relationships. See E. DURKHEIM, supra note 23, at 207-10.
The recent history of the relationship between contract and marriage is an interesting
one. In the 19th century, law and custom rigidly defined the obligations of husband and
wife: the husband was required to support, the wife to serve. Johnson, ContractLove, STUDFNT LAW., Feb. 1983, at 12, 14-15. Courts of this period were therefore unwilling to allow
marital duties to be varied by contract. See id. at 16. Over the last fifty years, as the duties
of married persons have become less status-oriented, courts have become increasingly receptive to contractual variation of marital obligations. See id. at 16-17.
110. Flexibility is further enhanced by the bifurcated focus of consent in complex contractual relationships. Rather than defining only the substance of exchange, consent is directed also toward shaping the structures and processes by which the contractual relationship will adjust to unforeseen circumstances. See I. MACNEIL, supra note 20, at 24-25, 47-50;
supra note 103. Examples of such bifurcation may be found in corporate charters and collective bargaining agreements.
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gation. A longstanding contractual relationship must be judged by
standards different from those that apply to a brief or newly
formed relationship. For example, in some jurisdictions, a contract
between persons who have a history of close and trusted dealings
may not be subject to the usual requirement that the contract be
in writing.11' As a contractual relationship develops, the collaboration gives rise to ties of community between the parties, which may
generate additional obligations. Maine notes that
[a]t the earliest dawn of... [Roman] jurisprudence, the term
in use for a Contract was ... nexum, and the parties to the
contract were said to be nexi ....

The notion that persons

under a contractual engagement are connected together by a
strong bond or chain, continued to the last to influence the Roand flowing thence it has mixed
man jurisprudence of Contract;
112
itself with modern ideas.

Additionally, because contemporary contracts often involve ongoing relationships, maintenance of the relationship becomes an important constraint upon both parties11 and thus implicates duties
of loyalty and cooperation.
C. Limitations of the Alternative Model
Just as the promise model's focus on the discrete and abstract
transaction creates weaknesses in that model, the exchange-relationship model has several limitations that arise because of its emphasis on the ongoing, nondiscrete contractual relationship. Specifically, the model has difficulty dealing with three problems of
contract theory: the enforceability of wholly executory contracts,
111. See, e.g., Harris v. Sentry Title Co., 715 F.2d 941, 945-48 (5th Cir. 1983) (imposing a
constructive trust).
112. H. MAINE, supra note 77, at 314; see also Farnsworth, supra note 30, at 582 (in two
African tribes, ongoing trading relationships are considered to be relationships of quasikinship); cf. United States Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navig. Co., 363 U.S. 574,
580-82 (1960) ("collective bargaining agreement" means the whole collective bargaining relation, not just the written contract); E. DuRKHmm, supra note 23, at 217 ("[E]xchange, as we

have seen, is not all there is to a contract. There is also the proper harmony of functions
concurring. They are not only in contact for the short time during which things pass from
one hand to another; but more extensive relations necessarily result from them, in the
course of which it is important that their solidarity be not troubled.").
113. L MAcNEmL, supra note 20, at 66.
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rights and obligations under highly discrete contracts, and rights
and obligations under unilateral promises.
1.

Executory Contracts

The exchange-relationship model accords a significant influence
to the role of nonpromissory factors in creating contractual obligations, and thus recognizes that expectations of performance may
exist without any belief in the morally obligatory nature of
promises. Similarly, by founding the doctrine of consideration on
the norm of reciprocity rather than on the separate elements of
benefit, reliance, and promise, the model need not rely on the
binding nature of promises to justify enforcing executory
agreements.
Nonetheless, it is not clear that the model supports the enforcement of wholly executory contracts. The norm of reciprocity obviously entails a duty not to disappoint the legitimate expectations
of a contractual partner. But in a wholly executory situation, the
norm itself cannot be the basis for determining whether an expectation of performance is legitimate, because the norm requires a
prior right or duty upon which to operate. Thus, it is unclear
whether this norm comes into play before there has been any reliance or conferral of benefit.
Because the exchange-relationship model focuses on ongoing relations, the characteristics of the model are not particularly useful
in generating a reasoned response to the question whether purely
executory contracts should be binding. The question simply does
not arise in the context of an ongoing contractual relationship. In
an ongoing relationship, reliance and conferral of benefit have already occurred and are occurring continuously. The best the model
can do in addressing this question is to refer to actual practice as
expressed through societal norms, law, and trade custom. If these
sources of rights and obligations recognize wholly executory agreements as binding agreements, a contractual relationship will incorporate that proposition.
2. Discrete Contracts
Although one may fault the promise model for failing to deal
adequately with complex and ongoing contractual relationships,
one must nevertheless recognize that short-term, simple, discrete
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contracts play a significant role in contemporary society. Because
the exchange-relationship model broadens the field of obligational
sources and relies heavily on cooperative adjustment of the contractual relationship over time, it does not provide great certainty.
Indeed, a principal strength of the model is its emphasis of flexibility over certainty. The exchange-relationship model may therefore be inappropriate in many situations. For example, in a dispute
over a contract for a sale of stock on a national exchange, legal
inquiry into the "relationship" between buyer and seller not only
would be a waste of time, but also would undermine the certainty
and predictability vital to the operation of the exchange.
3.

UnilateralPromises

The alternative model places contract in exchange and therefore
cannot offer any reason to enforce a promise that is not part of an
exchange. This incapacity exists even when a promisee has relied
on a promise, as long as the reliance did not occur in the context of
an exchange relationship. 1 14 This failure is difficult to justify theoretically, and is an embarrassing shortcoming in light of the fervor
with which contemporary contract doctrine embraces the notion of
promissory estoppel. 115
One could perhaps argue that contract law should be concerned
only with relations of reciprocity or, more specifically, with protecting the mutual trust necessary to the continuance of such relationships. A unilateral promise creates a relationship of complementary rights and obligations, whereas a relationship of
reciprocity is both more stable and more adaptable than one of

114. If the promise occurs within an exchange relationship, it is not really unilateral.
Many purported examples of promissory estoppel actually involve promises occurring within
exchange situations. For example:
A has been employed by B for 40 years. B promises to pay A a pension of
$200 per month when A retires. A retires and forbears to work elsewhere for
several years while B pays the pension. B's promise is binding.
RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 90 illustration 4. Similarly, the situation in Hoffman v. Red
Owl Stores, Inc., 26 Wis. 2d 683, 133 N.W.2d 267 (1965), was that of negotiations preliminary to an exchange. See supra note 38.
115. "A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance on the part of the promisee or a third person and which does induce such action or
forbearance is binding if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise." RESTATEENT, supra note 1, § 90(1).
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complementarity.1 1 6 But that distinction furnishes no reason for
reciprocity to define the limits of contractual obligation. As Professor Fried asks,
[W]hy is my enforceable promise to sell my brother-in-law my
automobile less sterile than my promise to give it to my
nephew? The law recognizes the completed transaction (after I
actually hand over or sign over the automobile), presumably 1in
recognition of my right to do with my property as I choose.' 7
One might also argue that promises are unlikely to occur in nonexchange situations. A person will rarely make a promise to another from whom the promisor neither has received some past benefit nor expects some future reciprocation. In such rare instances,
the law can prevent injustice by turning to some other source of
legal obligation. This argument seems to stretch the notion of "exchange" too far.
The only response to these criticisms may be that the characteristics of exchange relationships are sufficiently determinate and are
sufficiently distinct from the characteristics of promise relationships that the two types of relationships should be dealt with by
different branches of legal doctrine. Contract scholars and lawyers
should be concerned with developing rules that encourage and
strengthen exchange relationships. Furthermore, these rules should
enable such relationships to adapt to unforeseen circumstances
and to withstand the pressures of adverse conditions. The results
of such a doctrinal development are likely to be very different from
the rules that would be constructed in response only to a concern
for protecting justifiable reliance on unilateral promises.
III.

CONCLUSION: IMPLICATIONS OF THE CONTRAST

The two models of contract contrasted in this Article embody
drastically conflicting visions of the relation between contract and
community. The promise model envisions a marked antithesis between contractual relationships and community relationships. Contractual rights and obligations are rigidly defined by the promises
of the contracting parties, and trust between the parties is confined
116. See supra notes 66-77 and accompanying text.
117. C. FRmD, supra note 1, at 37 (emphasis in original).
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to the explicit terms of the promises. Structuring contract as unilateral obligations running in opposite directions focuses attention
on the zero-sum aspects of exchange and thereby accentuates and
justifies divisiveness and selfishness. 1i8 Emphasizing discreteness
and abstraction further constricts personal involvement in the contractual relationship. 119 Community relationships would be disrupted by such a regime of rigidity, selfishness, and limited personal involvement, for "[c]ommunal life needs to maintain the
lines of right and duty fluid in attention to an untrammeled trust.
It must subordinate the jealous defense of individualistic prerogative to the promotion of shared purpose and the reinforcement of
mutual involvement. ' 120 Accordingly, the promise model would
maintain a sharp division between contractual relationships and
community relationships.
In contrast, the exchange-relationship model seeks to heighten
the interaction between contract and community. It underscores
the flexibility and porosity of contractual obligation, stresses mutual dependence and cooperation between contracting parties, protects and encourages intense personal involvement. This model rejects the simplistic dichotomy of community as altruistic
sentimentalism and contract as self-interested materialism.'2 1 It
recognizes that contractual solidarity derives largely from the permeation of societal norms 122 and that social solidarity is enhanced
by furthering contractual relationships.1 23 It envisions contract and
community intermingling, with each realm richer for its association
with the other.

118. See I. MAcNE,, supra note 20, at 17-18.
119. Discrete transactions . . . are nonprimary relations. They involve only a
small part of the personality, are very limited in scope, are nonunique in personal terms, and hence can be transferred readily ... The satisfactions derived are limited to the narrow economic exchange being accomplished. Buying
gasoline for cash at a busy self-service station in a strange town is a fairly good
modern example.
Id. at 13.
120. Unger, supra note 103, at 624.
121. See Olsen, The Family and the Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal Reform, 96
HARv. L. REv. 1497 (1983); Unger, supra note 103, at 641-42.
122. See I. MAcNEIL, supra note 20, at 14, 58.
123. See id. at 93-94, 120 n.4.

